### Past webinars in this 2020 series

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<td>July 9</td>
<td>&quot;Assault Weapons Bans in the Americas&quot;</td>
<td>Newtown Action Alliance</td>
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</table>

Network to Prevent Gun Violence in the Americas

https://stopusarmstomexico.org/resources/prevent-gun-violence-americas/
CUGH Gun Control Tracker

Citizens of the United States can view the CUGH Gun Control Tracker to see their congressperson’s position on gun safety, which we hope can inform decisions in future elections.
Local solutions to gun violence. The experience of Cali, Colombia

Rodrigo Guerrero V., MD., M. Sc. Hyg., Dr. PH
Mayor of Cali, Colombia
Historical perspective of homicide rates in Colombia 1938-2014

Political violence

Political and Drug traffic violence
Age-adjusted Mortality Rate due to Homicides by Sex and type of Weapon, 2010

Source: IHME, 2012
Cali applied a multifactorial approach to violence prevention and control

Theoretical model for addressing urban violence
Risk factors associated with violence prevention and control

• Availability of firearms
• Alcohol consumption
• Cultural norms
• Organized crime
Availability of firearms

Type of Weapon in Homicides
Cali, 1993

- Firearms: 79%
- Sharp Objects: 17%
- Other: 4%
Alcohol Consumption and Homicide

Blood and alcohol level of homicide victims
Medellin, 1980 – 1989

57 %

43 %

50mg or >
<50mg %
Evidence-based policies

✧ Restriction of alcohol sales in public places
  ▪ Weekdays 2 AM
  ▪ Weekends 3 AM

✧ Restriction of firearms carrying permits, on evidence-based high-risk weekends
Alcohol Consumption and Homicide

Restriction of alcohol sales in bars as a policy for controlling homicide
Cali, 2005 – 2008

• First tested in London, UK
• Replicated as a natural experiment in Cali

Evaluation of 3 decrees closing bars between:

Restrictive: 02:00am -10:00am
Moderate: 03:00am -10:00am
Lax: 04:00am -10:00am

Significant reductions in firearm-related mortality
Alcohol and firearms restriction in Cali 1994

Without interventions

With interventions

Percent Reduction in Homicide

Firearms 14 % less

Alcohol + guns 35 % less
Rates of Homicide per 100,000 population due to firearms, Cali. 1983-2018

National Government restriction

Source: Cali Observatory of Security.
Pedagogical educational campaign to reduce firearm use and homicides

✓ Churches
✓ Educational Institutions
✓ Pedagogical strategies for sensitizing population in educational settings
Firearm buy-out program in Bogotá 2003

488 firearms,
10,264 ammunition
8 Hand grenades

Not formally evaluated
THANK YOU
Science in Service of Cities.
Killing of Chicago Student Unsettles Campus Life
OUR APPROACH

DEMONSTRATION → $$$

REDIRECT PUBLIC RESOURCES
Gun violence in the US

• 41 gun homicides and 192 non-fatal gun injuries per day in US

• Young black men die from homicide at 24 times the rate of their white counterparts

• Social cost of gun violence on order of $100 billion per year, or ~90% of social cost of violence

Sources: Centers for Disease Control, NEDS, Cook & Ludwig 2000
Chicago homicide rate in the middle of other big cities

Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR)
Chicago homicide rate, 1985-2016

768 Homicide Victims

2016
27.8

2015
17.5
Service gap for the majority of shooting victims

Many programs offered to youth

- Aftercare
- Becoming a Man (B.A.M.)
- Enlace Chicago
- Gang School Safety Team
- One Summer Chicago
- One Summer PLUS
- R.I.S.E.
- Street and School Intervention Program

Ages of Shooting Victims (2016)

Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR)
Service gap for the majority of shooting victims

But 87% of shooting victims 18+

Many programs offered to youth

- Aftercare
- Becoming a Man (B.A.M.)
- Enlace Chicago
- Gang School Safety Team
- One Summer Chicago
- One Summer PLUS
- R.I.S.E.
- Street and School Intervention Program

Ages of Shooting Victims (2016)

Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR)
Evidence that CBT and jobs can reduce violence involvement
Programming

**RELENTLESS ENGAGEMENT**
*Intensive outreach that won’t give up on difficult-to-engage participants*

**COGNITIVE BEHAVIORAL THERAPY**
*CBT infused throughout READI including group sessions*

**CAREER OPPORTUNITIES**
*Increased responsibilities, pay raises, sector-based training*

**SUPPORT SERVICES**
*One-on-one development sessions, referrals to critical supports*
What would have happened without READI?
Shooting and homicide victimizations per 100 people over 20 months

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Victims per 100 people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>READI Control Group</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>READI Neighborhoods, Men 18-34</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago, Men 18-34</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago, All</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We are learning a lot about their experiences

- 95% have ever been arrested
- 79% have been a victim of a violent crime
- 37% have ever been shot
- 75% have lost a family member to gun violence
- 58% have children
- 14% are housing insecure
Thank you

For more information about the University of Chicago Crime Lab and Education Lab:

Kim Smith - kimberlys@uchicago.edu
Roseanna Ander - rander@uchicago.edu
REDUCING URBAN GUN VIOLENCE: WHAT WORKS?

LESSONS LEARNED AND INSIGHTS FOR THE FIELD AND PUBLIC POLICY

CUGH Webinar: July 2020

www.thecapartnership.org
OVERVIEW

1. Brief Framing and Background (CPSC)
2. Our Approach and The Evidence
3. Case Study: Oakland Ceasefire
4. Early Lessons in Mexico City
1. Our mission is to help cities advance a public safety “triple bottom line” – reduce serious violence, build police-community trust, achieve better outcomes for highest risk young people.

2. We engage in long-term (3-5 years) partnerships with cities to apply evidence based practices to these durable safety problems.

3. To do this, we help cities:
   a. Understand their violence problem (problem definition)
   b. Develop and manage violence reduction strategies
   c. Develop effective outreach and intervention approaches
   d. Pursue police-community trust building
   e. Apply performance management to this problem
   f. Research and impact evaluations of local efforts.
The Basics: Reducing Gun Violence

1. Gun violence is the most serious safety problem that we face in communities.

1. It is a problem that we can do something about in the near-term.

1. Across models and communities, there are certain “key ingredients” that are essential:

   - Political will and leadership (a shared strategy)
   - Using an evidence-based strategy
   - Understanding the problem and focusing on those at highest risk of violence now
   - Building devoted, sustainable infrastructure for reducing violence
   - Being accountable for violence reduction outcomes across partners and sectors
Leading Models and Research Evidence (1): Operation Ceasefire / Focused Deterrence

To reduce violence, CPSC works primarily from the “focused deterrence” / Ceasefire framework, for several reasons:

• The largest body of research evidence supports it’s effectiveness in reducing violence. (20/25 evaluations, 2 meta-reviews).

• It has consistently been shown to reduce community violence and individual recidivism. *It is an evidence based strategy.*

• It is an effective way to mobilize police, justice system, community and social service actors to reduce gun violence in the near-term.
**Systematic Review of Focused Deterrence**
Braga, Weisburd, and Turchan (2018), *Criminology and Public Policy*

- Review identified 24 rigorous evaluations with control groups
- Overall, focused deterrence programs were associated with moderate crime reductions
- Group Violence Reduction Strategies were associated with larger crime reductions.

### Mean Effect Sizes for Study Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Studyname</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Std diff in means</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>p-Value</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lowell PSN</td>
<td>Gun assaults</td>
<td>1.186</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indianapolis VRS</td>
<td>Total homicides</td>
<td>1.039</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>NH Longevity</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>0.936</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nashville DMI</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>0.858</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockton, CA</td>
<td>Gun homicides</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rochester Ceasefire</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>0.675</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOLA GVRS</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>0.656</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston Ceasefire I</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>0.645</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KC NoWA</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>0.607</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA Ceasefire</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>0.565</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>0.108</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rockford DMI</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>0.521</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>0.057</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boston Ceasefire II</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>0.503</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago GVRS</td>
<td>Total gang shootings</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cincinnati IRV</td>
<td>GVMI homicides</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow CIRV</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.025</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guntersville DMI</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>0.222</td>
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<tr>
<td>High Point DMI</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.054</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newark Ceasefire</td>
<td>Gun shot wounds</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago PSN</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roanoke DMI</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle DMI</td>
<td>All crime</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.032</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peoria DMI</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0.901</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ccsna DMI</td>
<td>All crime</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.985</td>
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<tr>
<td>Montgomery DMI</td>
<td>All crime</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.661</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.383</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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</table>

Random Effects Model, $Q = 122.568$, df = 23, $p < 0.000$

- Combined Mean ES = 0.383
- GVRS Mean ES = 0.657

Mean Effect Sizes for Study Outcomes
Random Effects Model, $Q = 122.568$, df = 23, $p < 0.000$
The core, uniting features of the effective or promising models are:

1. They all focus on people at the very highest risk of serious violence now,

2. They all have a primary goal of changing the decisions and behavior of those at very highest risk to reduce shootings and homicides in the near-term (as victim or perpetrator)

3. They all work in collaboration with other system and community partners.

4. Most of them are engaged in ongoing research and evaluation to understand what is/isn’t working and why.
Oakland’s Failed Attempts to Reduce Violence

Oakland had previously made numerous attempts to reduce this chronic violence problem

- Youth Curfew
- Gang Injunction
- Large service and outreach investments (Measure Y, private investments)
- Poorly designed/managed attempts at “Ceasefire” in 2006, 2009
- Numerous waves of aggressive, “zero tolerance” area-based enforcement

Take Away: These efforts were not informed by a thorough analysis/understanding of the problem; were poorly managed; did not constitute an effective citywide strategy.
Oakland Ceasefire Goals

1. Reduce shootings and homicides citywide.

1. Decrease recidivism and improve outcomes for those at highest risk of violence.

2. Strengthen police-community relations and trust.

THE “TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE” – GOALS AND A UNIFYING SET OF VALUES.
Problem Analysis Insights and Implications

What the public and policy makers thought: Violence primarily driven by juveniles, drugs disputes and economic motives.

What the analysis revealed:
• Homicide primarily driven by specific running group/gang conflicts and personal disputes between group members.
• Those at very highest risk primarily group-involved adult men of color (the average age is 30)
• With heavy justice system involvement (averaging 12 prior arrests at the time of homicide, 7 for felonies) and social connections to actively violent street groups
• Only 10% of homicide involved juveniles, only 13% of homicides had any connection to drugs.
Focus on the very high risk individuals.

OAKLAND’S POPULATION

CRIMINAL JUSTICE POPULATION

VERY HIGH RISK POPULATION

400k people

20k people

250-350 people

www.thecapartnership.org
Oakland Ceasefire Performance Management:

1. PD Shooting Reviews – identify VHR people, hottest conflicts, enforcement and intervention priorities.

1. Coordination Meetings – Human Services Department, OPD, community partners develop near term strategy for these particular people and conflicts – mobilize community intervention partners.

1. Performance Review Meetings – Partners review citywide shootings trends; key program activities; relative to annual and two-month benchmarks.
CEASEFIRE Strategy
Progress in Oakland 2012-2018

*Ceasefire Partnership began on October 18, 2012.*
CROSS-CITY RESULTS

Estimated 31.5% reduction controlling for other trends and seasonal variations ($p<.05$).

Only 2 of 12 comparison cities experienced significant reductions during this time period (Stockton, San Francisco).

Monthly Counts of Gun Homicides in Oakland, 2010 - 2017

Cessfire Implementation

- Monthly Count of Gun Homicides
- Pre-test Mean = 7.81
- Post-test Mean = 6.15
GMI V. NON-GMI

GMI shootings decreased by 43.2% while non-GMI shootings decreased by only 23.2%.

QUASI-EXP RESULTS

Estimated 27.0% reduction in shootings by treated gangs relative to untreated gangs ($p<.05$).

Estimated 26.0% reduction in shootings by vicariously-treated gangs relative to untreated gangs ($p<.05$).
Early Lessons and Insights from Mexico City Demonstration Projet

1. The super concentration of risk is very similar and the violence dynamics are very familiar.

2. Very little infrastructure exists to focus on this highest risk population – both within justice system and community / service stakeholders.

1. Implementation remains difficult: “Ceasefire” requires local actors to work differently and together — often for the first time. This is always difficult.

   • Systemic challenges with Mexico’s legal and justice system and the lack of community intervention programs compound these challenges.

1. Impact and sustainability will requires organizational change: Political will and quality implementation are the key ingredients.

2. Overall, the opportunities and challenges are more similar to U.S. context than they are different.
Building Effective, Resilient, and Trusted Police Organizations in Mexico
ORGANIZED CRIME VS. PUBLIC SAFETY

Mexico and the U.S.: drugs, arms, trade, criminal organizations
WHAT SHOULD WE DO INSTEAD?

Mexico and the U.S.: drugs, arms, trade, criminal organizations

Crime is **concentrated** in a small number of high risk places

Concentrating efforts through **evidence-based interventions** can have substantial and long-lasting effects
IMPLEMENTING CEASEFIRE IN MEXICO CITY
WHAT MAKES MEXICO DIFFERENT?

1. Justice system: prosecution (Fiscalía) and Ministry of Security

2. Lack of trust and credibility in institutions: rampant corruption and impunity.

3. Culture of non-collaboration between institutions.

4. Presence of criminal organizations
ADAPTATION

1. Adapt the model to the Mexican context with the California Partnership for Safe Communities and the Ministry of Citizen Security.

2. Pre-analysis of the problem in six police sectors to select a pilot sector.

3. Identify work teams and specific profiles.

4. Begin the process of changing mindset (a new way of approaching homicides).
1. Out of the six sectors, selected “Plateros”.

2. 260,000 inhabitants divided in 86 neighborhoods.

3. Plateros has among the top ten homicide rates in Mexico City.
PROBLEM ANALYSIS


2. Identified more than 18 groups that generate the greatest amount of lethal violence.

3. Identified close to 505 people involved in lethal violence (victims and perpetrators).
HOMICIDE TREND IN PLATEROS

![Homicide Trend Graph](image)
WORKGROUP - CEASEFIRE UNIT
INCIDENT REVIEW

Ministry of Citizen Security
- Ceasefire Unit
- School Safety Unit
- Undersecretary of Information and Police Intelligence
- Undersecretary for Citizen Participation and Crime Prevention
- Sector Police
- Police of Alvaro Obregon

Attorney General of Mexico City
- Central Investigative Prosecutor’s Office
- Deputy Attorney General’s Office for the Attention of Victims of Crime and Community Services
- Central Preliminary Investigation Department

Penitentiary System
- General Directorate of Specialized Care for Adolescents
- Executive Directorate of Procedural Security Agents
- Information Control and Statistics Directorate

Decentralized Agencies
- Command and Control Center West (C2)
Case: On January 11th, two boys (age 14) were found shot dead in Plateros.

Direct communication:
- Contact was made with one of the boys’ mother by the Ministry of Citizen Security.
  ○ Contact was possible thanks to the cooperation between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Citizen Security (which, in parallel, facilitated the creation of a hospital-based violence intervention program).
- The mother confessed that her husband (the boy’s dad), as well as other family members, wanted to take revenge since they had information about who was responsible.

Social services:
- The Ministry of Citizen Security offered psychological support to the boy’s family. An external psychologist accompanied by staff from the Office of Violence Prevention of the Ministry of Citizen Security offered group therapy to the family (mother, father, and siblings).
  ○ During family therapy, a non-violence message was directed to them with the purpose of preventing future retaliation (or any kind of violence) and to ensure that the murders would be investigated.
Justice Component:

- Due to the coordination between the Ministry of Citizen Security and the Attorney General, the boy’s mother was referred to the Deputy Attorney General's Office for the Attention of Victims of Crime and Community Services.
  ○ A legal advisor was assigned to her case in order to ensure that the evidence and information gathered during the Incident Reviews will be used during the investigation.

- A Public Prosecutor (Ministerio Público) was assigned to the case to lead the murder investigations. Currently, the suspect of the murder was identified and the public prosecutor is collecting the evidence for his detention.

- The group connected to this murder is being investigated by different police units gathering information to identify the suspect and his network.
## VIOLENCE VICTIMS SOCIAL SERVICES SUPPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Supports</th>
<th>Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 11    | 45            | 140      | Food  
Containment and emotional support  
Thanatological support  
Funeral Expenses  
Group therapies  
Hospital visits  
Legal advice  
Remote health care  
Scholarships  
Official documents  
Addiction treatment  
Referral to city programs: Women, Art, Youth, Child Rights, Sports |
HOW DO WE EVALUATE ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE?

To evaluate the organizational components of Ceasefire (building trust, communication, information-sharing, cooperation...), we are currently conducting

- Semi-structured interviews with members of the Ceasefire unit and “controls”.
- Close-ended questionnaires with members of the Ceasefire unit and “controls”.
- Following group dynamics in the weekly meetings through non-participant observation instruments.
**Similarities, Differences**

1. Dynamics of violence, concentration of violence in groups and subgroups, characteristics of individuals and needs, etc. – remarkably similar

2. Institutional rigidities, starting points, mindsets – very similar

3. Reliability, speed, nature of “levers” – evenness of institutional capacity: VERY different. Requires creativity, patience, flexibility. **Process** not “features”
Building Effective, Resilient, and Trusted
Police Organizations in Mexico
ENOUGH IS ENOUGH

LIVE FREE CHICAGO
2016 Homicides

• Chicago 762 Homicides
• New York 334 Homicides
• Los Angeles 294 Homicides
Office of Violence Prevention
Chicago 2017

- Office of Public Health
- 2.4 Million Dollar Budget
- Cyber Bullying, Teen dating, and other areas of violence not dedicated to gun violence
Which Tactic

Law and Order
• Hire more police
• Invest in punitive approaches
• Support policies and practices that criminalize black and brown communities

Public Health Approach
• Community Investment
• Trauma Informed, focused, and centered
• Reconciliation
Which Tactic

- Law and Order
  - Hire more police
  - Invest in punitive approaches
  - Support policies and practices that criminalize black and brown communities

- Public Health Approach
  - Community Investment
  - Trauma Informed, focused, and centered
  - Reconciliation

Proven failed approach
Recommendations

• Office of Gun Violence Prevention created through municipal code
• Direct funding toward communities most impacted by gun violence
  • Over 60% of homicides occur in 15 neighborhoods (77 in Chicago)
• Coordinate a public strategy
Recommendations

• Invest a significant amount of funding into community-based strategies, mental health, and economic vitality of black and communities

• Adopt a public health model and education campaign.
  • Root causes of gun violence racism and poverty
DEFUND the Police?
Gun Violence in the Americas: Local Solutions to a Hemispheric Challenge
Violencia armada en las Américas: soluciones locales a un desafío hemisférico

Thursday, July 16, 2020
jueves, 16 de julio de 2020
1:00pm-2:30pm EDT

Dr. Rodrigo Guerrero
Former Mayor
Cali, Colombia
Ex alcalde

Kim Smith
Director of Programs
University of Chicago Crime Lab
Directora de programas

Ciera Walker
Executive Director
Live Free Chicago
Directora ejecutiva

Dr. Rodrigo Canales
Associate Professor of Organizational Behavior
Yale School of Management
Profesor asociado de comportamiento organizacional

Moderated by:

Vaughn Crandall
Co-Director
California Partnership for Safe Communities
Co-Director

Jeremy Biddle
Executive Director
MetroPEACE
Director ejecutivo
Gun Violence in the Americas: Local Solutions to a Hemispheric Challenge
Violencia armada en las Américas: soluciones locales a un desafío hemisférico

Las presentaciones serán en inglés con traducción simultánea en español

Questions and Answers

Dr. Rodrigo Guerrero
Former Mayor
Cali, Colombia
Ex alcalde

Kim Smith
Director of Programs
University of Chicago Crime Lab
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